The ADS-B Fixation Is a Dangerous Myth

Pilots, press, and policymakers often look to ADS-B as a central solution for drone collisions. But while ADS-B improves visibility, the systems that actually prevent midair collisions—like TCAS or radar-based detect-and-avoid—don’t rely on broadcasting. They interrogate, compute, and react.

Most people don’t realize there are three primary systems used to detect aircraft in U.S. airspace: primary radar, which passively detects anything reflective; secondary radar, which uses transponders to relay identifying data and altitude; and ADS‑B Out, a GPS-based system that broadcasts an aircraft’s position and velocity to other equipped aircraft and ground stations.

In 2023, a regional jet collided midair with a U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopter just outside Washington, D.C. Though the jet was equipped with TCAS, no alert was issued before impact. The helicopter, reportedly flying a government mission, was not broadcasting its position—likely due to operational security protocols common for military and federal aircraft operating in restricted airspace. In such cases, exemptions from ADS‑B and transponder use are not only legal but routine. The result: one aircraft invisible by design, the other unaware until it was too late.

“There’s this assumption that if everyone just flipped on ADS-B, midairs would go away,” said an aviation expert with deep experience in both commercial aviation and UAS operations. “But the truth is, ADS-B was never meant to cover non-cooperative, low-level, or tactical operations. And a lot of those flights happen every day.”

While some pointed to ADS‑B mandates as the missing safeguard, those familiar with the case say the crash had little to do with equipment failure. It’s a reminder that even in the most protected airspace in the country, the systems meant to prevent midairs can go quiet—sometimes on purpose.

The FAA itself has acknowledged this risk. “ADS-B Out is prohibited on most drones to preserve the integrity of the airspace system,” the agency wrote in its Remote ID rule. “Uncontrolled proliferation of ADS-B transmissions from UAS could cause air traffic displays to become saturated and unusable.”

Kerrville is the more recent, more telling example. On July 7, 2025, a Texas Army National Guard Blackhawk collided with a DJI Mavic 3E drone flown by a certified law enforcement officer during flood rescue operations. The drone was operating under an approved search and rescue mission and had not exceeded its altitude ceiling. It was reportedly in Return to Home mode when the collision occurred.

ADS-B would not have prevented the Kerrville incident, according to the same aviation expert. “ADS-B is a broadcast-only signal. If the receiving aircraft isn’t equipped with ADS-B In—and most military helicopters aren’t—then it won’t see the drone, no matter what the drone is transmitting,” he explained.

In this case, the drone was not required to broadcast ADS-B. Nor would a broadcast have made a difference. The Blackhawk was not scanning for signals. It was not equipped to detect the Mavic 3E’s presence. And the Mavic, in turn, had no means of detecting or evading the helicopter. “There’s a tendency to treat visibility as prevention,” the expert said. “But if one side can’t see and the other isn’t listening, it’s just a signal in the dark.”

While DJI drones come equipped with AirSense—an ADS-B In receiver that allows the drone to detect nearby manned aircraft broadcasting ADS-B Out—that feature doesn’t make the drone visible to other aircraft. And in fleet applications, software like DroneSense has ADS-B broadcasting disabled by default to comply with FAA restrictions and avoid cluttering the airwaves.

Christian Ramsey, president of uAvionix, offered a blunt assessment in a recent interview: “The FAA has banned the use of ADS-B Out on most drones… If drones were to equip with ADS-B, there’d be too many in the sky. You’d have a cluttered airspace. Controllers wouldn’t know what to do. You, as a pilot, wouldn’t know what to do.”

That misunderstanding is driving some of the loudest policy proposals today. After the Kerrville crash, commentators in aviation forums and social media circles immediately called for mandatory ADS-B on all drones—despite the FAA explicitly banning it in most cases. Part 89, which governs Remote ID, and Part 91 both restrict routine ADS-B Out use for unmanned aircraft under 400 feet, in part to prevent spectrum congestion. Flood the skies with broadcasting drones, and you don’t get clarity. You get chaos.

“ADS-B In on drones makes sense. ADS-B Out, not so much,” AOPA noted in a 2021 technical briefing. “The FAA’s concern is airspace clutter, and rightly so—thousands of drones pinging their position at 1Hz would jam the skies.”

In fact, the systems that do prevent midairs don’t just receive signals—they interrogate. TCAS, the Traffic Collision Avoidance System used on commercial airliners and some helicopters, works by actively querying nearby aircraft transponders. When another aircraft replies, the system calculates closure rate, altitude, and bearing—and if necessary, issues an audible climb or descend command to the pilot. It doesn’t rely on passive broadcast.

Even with both aircraft equipped with TCAS, though, avoidance isn’t guaranteed. As one aviation expert noted, "Most drones don’t carry transponders, and they’re too small to reliably show up on radar. ADS-B makes them visible to some aircraft, but it doesn’t make them cooperative." That distinction matters. TCAS depends on active cooperation between both aircraft. A drone on autopilot or Return to Home is not going to maneuver.

For manned aircraft, this creates a new kind of risk: the non-cooperative vehicle. An object that isn’t broadcasting, isn’t responding, and isn’t maneuvering in any predictable way. In Kerrville, that non-cooperative status went both ways. The drone couldn’t detect or avoid the helicopter. The helicopter, operating under its own visual and mission parameters, couldn’t see the drone.

That tension—between what should be seen and what can be avoided—is where the conversation has stalled. “ADS‑B would not have saved the helicopter and CRJ in Washington, D.C.,” said Kyle Nordfors, a commercial aviation and UAS specialist. While he emphasized that broadcast signals aren’t a cure-all for modern airspace risks, others in the field have echoed the concern: drones flying low-level missions, military aircraft operating without ADS-B, and civilian aircraft without receivers all exist in the same invisible grid.

George Guerra, a former commercial pilot and aviation safety advocate, put it more bluntly: “I get the FAA’s concern, but the risk is real. Every drone should broadcast something—even if it’s not ADS-B. We can’t afford another midair.”

That grid is only going to get more crowded. With the FAA’s upcoming Part 108 rulemaking for beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) drone operations, many large-scale UAS deployments are expected to multiply. Companies from utilities to police departments to delivery services are deploying drones under waivers or experimental certificates. Many of those aircraft do use ADS-B In—to spot manned aircraft and get out of the way. But if the manned aircraft isn’t broadcasting? Or if it's military, covert, or low-level? The system breaks.

“Aviation safety briefings have consistently warned that small drones—even at legal altitudes—are nearly impossible to spot visually from a helicopter or low-flying aircraft, especially at speed. And traditional radar systems often fail to detect such small, low-altitude objects.

Even the best-equipped drone won’t help if the pilot isn’t trained, the software isn’t updated, or the procedures aren’t followed. Across the country, public safety agencies and contractors are deploying UAS systems without consistent standards for coordination, deconfliction, or pilot discipline. Some programs are rigorous. Others treat drone ops like a camera on a stick. “We’re flooding the skies faster than we’re preparing people to fly in them,” one aviation expert warned. Visibility might help—but it doesn’t replace training, judgment, or airspace coordination.

That’s the ADS-B illusion: the belief that visibility equals safety. In reality, safety comes from systems that detect, interpret, and react. Broadcast isn’t enough.

The Pilot Institute, a widely used drone training resource, echoed this concern in its ADS‑B primer: “An ADS‑B feature is not a substitute for the usual safety measures – maintaining visual contact, scanning the surroundings for hazards, or even checking for NOTAMs before flying your drone.” Visibility can help—but it’s no replacement for preparation and airspace discipline.