On August 22, 2025, Skydio circulated a safety bulletin to law enforcement and federal partners acknowledging that handheld radios could disable its X10 and X10D controllers. The company listed possible outcomes including loss of communication with the aircraft, degraded video feed quality, automatic return-to-home activations triggered by link loss, and in some cases charging failures or complete power loss. That last outcome was tied directly to radios transmitting in the 450 to 500 megahertz range. Skydio’s guidance was to maintain a twelve-inch separation between radios and controllers, confirm return-to-home and lost-link settings before flight, and contact support if problems persisted. The company said shielding would be introduced in future controllers and that software would be developed to notify pilots if interference was detected, but confirmed that the current hardware remained vulnerable.
The bulletin arrives as cities across the United States are expanding Drone as First Responder programs built on Skydio hardware. Huntington Beach, California, has committed to a three-dock deployment promising sub-two-minute response times. Sunny Isles Beach, Florida, announced what it called the state’s first fully operational Skydio and Axon DFR program. Miami Beach used Skydio X10 drones during its spring break operations, while Cleveland, Ohio, launched flights this summer under a new unmanned systems policy. Cincinnati, Oklahoma City, Redmond, Amarillo, Minnetonka, and Pasco County have each confirmed Skydio deployments.
The police departments in those cities largely operate on 700 or 800 megahertz P25 trunked systems. For them, Skydio’s bulletin translates into a practical rule: radios cannot be left on the same table as a drone controller without risking disruption. The risk becomes greater in multi-agency incidents. Fire, EMS, and search-and-rescue teams often rely on UHF channels inside the danger range Skydio described. National interop frequencies known as UCALL and UTAC are allocated at 453 to 458 megahertz. Ambulance-to-hospital MED channels operate at 462 and 467 megahertz. CERT volunteers and private EMS also transmit in those ranges on FRS and GMRS radios. Federal frequency guides confirm these allocations as nationwide standards.
The hazard is continuous in large metro systems. The New York Police Department and the Fire Department of New York continue to operate on UHF T-Band channels between 470 and 512 megahertz, including 485 megahertz. The Los Angeles Police Department uses the same band. Skydio has acknowledged that transmissions in this range are capable of disabling controller charging and even causing shutdown. In those jurisdictions, the limitation is present every time a controller is powered on. Some with direct knowledge of Skydio’s earlier deployments say the interference problem was already observed during the X2 era, long before the August 22 bulletin. Internal agency communications reviewed by The Zero Lux indicate that memos were circulated to federal and local partners acknowledging interference risks during X2 deployments. If accurate, it would mean the company and its government customers were aware of the vulnerability years before it was publicly disclosed.
Engineers familiar with Skydio hardware note that the X2 and X10 both use the same Microhard radio module. This raises the possibility that UHF transmissions are overwhelming the 2.4 GHz front end through out-of-band coupling, consistent with the company’s admission that radios in the 450 to 500 MHz range can cause controller failures. One engineer noted that RF vulnerability has been observed across multiple drones tested for government use, including platforms such as the Teal 2 and Parrot Anafi USA Gov, which also rely on Microhard radios. Other systems, like the Spirit Ascent and Freefly Astro, have used Doodle Labs radios instead.
Public documentation from that period shows the issue was at least under discussion. In 2023, the Department of Homeland Security’s National Urban Security Technology Laboratory tested the Skydio X2. The evaluation noted lag and pixelation in the video feed but did not attribute those issues to radio interference. Separate Skydio release notes from the X2 era describe radio sensitivity adjustments, indicating that the company was tuning its control links in response to interference. Neither the DHS report nor Skydio’s public notices, however, made reference to handheld UHF portables transmitting near controllers.
Communications reliability is already a defined safety requirement in unmanned aviation. The National Wildfire Coordinating Group’s UAS operations guide requires pilots to “confirm/test communications (AM/FM/cell/satellite)” before flight, to consider “GCS link to aircraft (terrain/vegetation)” during site surveys, and to “ensure communication can be maintained on assigned frequencies.” The guide also lists a “frequency guide” as part of the standard kit. The National SAR Committee’s UAS addendum was written to provide “guidance on how to employ UAS for SAR,” and national interoperability guides designate 155.160 MHz as “the de facto SAR interoperability channel.” These standards recognize that radios of every band will be present at command posts where drones are deployed.
The FAA has long required operators to anticipate and mitigate link loss. Advisory Circular 107-2A states that “if the remote PIC loses the control link… the aircraft would continue to fly the programmed mission/return home to land,” and further instructs that “if connection cannot be reestablished, start procedures for loss of control link.” NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System includes lost links and equipment issues among the reportable hazards. By Skydio’s own account, handheld radios within a foot of the controller now belong in that category.
The operational consequences are foreseeable. A Skydio controller deployed at a wildfire could be knocked offline when a firefighter places a UHF portable on the same table. During a stadium evacuation, a medic transmitting on a MED channel could trigger a return-to-home, sending the aircraft back over a crowd instead of holding station. In New York or Los Angeles, where every patrol officer’s radio transmits in the affected band, the risk of controller shutdown exists during every routine deployment.
Regulation under Part 107.15 makes clear that no person may operate a small unmanned aircraft unless it is in a condition for safe operation. That standard places responsibility on operators. Agencies adopting Skydio systems must now demonstrate how they will meet that requirement, whether through training, procedural safeguards, or equipment replacement.
Skydio’s August 22 bulletin does not ground the X10. It does, however, formally acknowledge a vulnerability that appears to have allegedly been known internally since the X2. For cities that have already committed millions of dollars to Drone as First Responder programs, the guidance adds a radio buffer zone to every controller. For fire and SAR agencies, it intersects with long-standing federal doctrine that requires proven communications before flight. And for major cities like New York and Los Angeles, it means the radios carried by every officer and firefighter operate inside the range Skydio says can disable its controllers.
The promise of Drone as First Responder programs is faster situational awareness and quicker response to emergencies. The reality, now confirmed by Skydio and reinforced by internal government memoranda, is that America’s newest drone controllers remain susceptible to interference from the very radios public safety depends on.
